In relation to phenomenology, rather than making a somewhat internal description of lived experience, shouldn’t one, couldn’t one instead analyze a number of collective and social experiences?
Michel Foucault. (1996) [1988]. ‘What our present is’. In Sylvère Lotringer (ed.) Foucault Live (Interviews, 1961-1984). Tr. Lysa Hochroth and John Johnston. 2nd edition. New York: Semiotext(e), p.408.
I particularly like this comment. Often philosophy is characterised as being about the description and analysis of purely interior experience or abstract forms of knowledge which are somehow removed from external locations in history and in a society. In other words, philosophy is a form of knowledge which is about the interior and the eternal or about finding the essences of those things underneath the banalities of lived experience. Why shouldn’t philosophy be about our engagement with history, the present with each other and our limitations in very specific -rather than abstract – instances?
Refracted Input 
Just found this other post by you after sending you my comment to Foucault and Philosophy and yes, isn’t that where we need to head towards? We’re not far from understanding that some men look at their watch every time they wish to avoid making human contact with a person approaching them or that obesity is the expression of social alienation, lack of cohesion, or that suicide and its loneliness is just that.
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